David O\u27Connor, GOD, EVIL, AND DESIGN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES by Basinger, David
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 27 Issue 4 Article 10 
10-1-2010 
O'Connor, GOD, EVIL, AND DESIGN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
David Basinger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Basinger, David (2010) "O'Connor, GOD, EVIL, AND DESIGN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
ISSUES," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 27 : Iss. 4 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol27/iss4/10 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
474 Faith and Philosophy
have a hard time convincing a skeptic without at least attempting to meet 
baker’s challenge, but that doesn’t mean her Christian beliefs are epistemi-
cally flawed. I am persuaded that Plantinga’s argument demonstrates that 
it is epistemically possible that an ideally situated (epistemically speak-
ing) Christian could be fully rational, justified, and warranted in her beliefs 
about God even if she does not meet the challenge embedded in baker’s 
expanded de jure objection. (It’s another question completely whether there 
exist any ideally situated Christians. And it is on this point, I suggest, that 
Plantinga’s religious epistemology should be pressed.)
In conclusion, while I’m inclined to think that there is some problem 
with a Christian that does not (or will not) meet baker’s challenge in any 
way, why assume that the problem is epistemic? what if instead the prob-
lem is theological (or maybe practical)? In other words, suppose that a 
person’s beliefs are warranted (in Plantinga’s sense) but that she doesn’t 
meet baker’s challenge. Her problem is a failure to follow through on the 
Great Commission, to seek to present her beliefs in a persuasive fashion to 
her unbelieving friends. This failure, however, doesn’t obviously suggest 
that her Christian beliefs are epistemically flawed; the problem might in-
stead be found in her understanding and application of Christian beliefs.
God, Evil, and Design: An introduction to the Philosophical issues, by David 
O’Connor. blackwell Publishing, 2008. Pp. 225. $25.00 (paper)
DAVID bASINGer, roberts wesleyan College
The focus of this book—the problem of evil—has been discussed by phi-
losophers for the past two thousand years. It is a pleasant surprise, accord-
ingly, to find a treatment of this issue from a new perspective, as is the case 
with God, Evil, and Design.
O’Connor’s discussion of the relationship between God and evil focus-
es on two questions. The first is “whether the idea of God squares with the 
fact that many terrible things happen for no apparent reason, or whether 
that fact is good reason to think there is no God” (p. 7). The second is 
“whether, all things considered, the good as well as the bad, it is reason-
able to conclude that God [exists and] is the original source and cause of 
the universe” (p. 8).
we are invited by O’Connor to conduct our consideration of these ques-
tions behind a “veil of ignorance.” Specifically, we are invited to suspend 
any personal religious beliefs when considering the relationship between 
evil and God’s existence and also to pretend to know nothing about re-
ligion or philosophy when considering God as a possible cause for our 
universe. O’Connor grants that stepping behind the veil in this sense is 
not easy. but it is possible, he contends, and can enable us to conduct a 
neutral, unbiased investigation.
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O’Connor rightly notes that the question of whether evil renders be-
lief in the concept of God unreasonable actually requires consideration 
of two more specific questions: (1) whether simultaneous belief in God 
and evil is logically impossible and (2) whether belief in God in the face 
of evil, even if not self-contradictory, is improbable, given the evil we 
experience.
The focus of O’Connor’s discussion of the logical possibility of God’s 
existence, given evil, is the well-known debate between J. L. Mackie and 
Alvin Plantinga. After reviewing for us Mackie’s contention that the si-
multaneous existence of both a good, omnipotent God and evil is logi-
cally impossible if we assume, as we must, that a good, omnipotent being 
will eliminate evil completely, O’Connor concludes that Mackie fails to 
prove a contradiction between the idea of God and the fact of evil because 
Mackie does not rule out the possibility of some additional relevant fact 
that would make it possible for God and evil to co-exist. O’Connor then 
considers and ultimately concurs with Alvin Plantinga’s stronger claim 
that simultaneous belief in the existence of evil and God can be estab-
lished as possible because it is possible that God created a world contain-
ing persons with freedom that cannot be controlled by God (libertarian 
freedom), that the misuse of this freedom is the cause of evil, and that this 
world, even with this evil, is on balance good.
This still leaves us with the need to determine whether the amount and 
types of evil we experience render God’s existence improbable. but be-
fore discussing this variation of his first question, O’Connor invites us to 
consider his second question: whether it is reasonable from behind the 
veil to believe that God is the ultimate cause of all. As O’Connor sees it, 
there are basically three explanatory hypotheses for the remarkable order, 
regularity, and complexity we undeniably experience in the natural realm: 
(1) the chance hypothesis, which postulates that this is the only universe 
and that both natural order and the initial conditions at the big bang are 
due to chance; (2) the multiverse hypothesis, which postulates that this 
universe is only one of many, thus increasing the chance of the evil we 
experience coming about; and (3) the design hypothesis, which postulates 
that our universe, including the initial conditions at the big bang, exists 
by intentional design.
O’Connor acknowledges that all three hypotheses face significant dif-
ficulties. But he focuses his discussion on those difficulties facing the de-
sign hypothesis, which include the problem of positing a non-physical 
ultimate cause, the problem of how God can actualize divine intentions if 
humans possess libertarian freedom, and the problem of understanding 
how a world designed by a good God could have the amounts and types 
of evil we experience. His “behind the veil” conclusion is that, while the 
world as we experience it might give us some reason to assume that the 
ultimate cause of all is outside of the natural order, the idea of God as this 
ultimate cause “would not come up as the overall best explanation,” given 
the evil we experience (p. 107).
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we then return to the question of whether God’s existence is probable, 
given evil. Specifically, O’Connor asks us to consider from behind the veil 
whether the fact that evil makes the belief that God is the ultimate cause 
of our world improbable offers us a rational basis for believing that God 
probably does not exist. He first reviews Paul Draper’s attempt to show 
that, all things considered, the belief that there exists a God who is re-
sponsible for a world with so much evil is quite unreasonable and william 
rowe’s argument that none of the allegedly justifying reasons for evil of-
fered by theists even remotely justifies the number of types of horrific evil 
we experience and thus that there quite probably is no God. O’Connor 
then assesses sympathetically responses by Stephen wykstra and Peter 
van Inwagen, who both argue in some fashion that we aren’t in possession 
of an objective standard for “excess evil” in relation to which we can say 
that the amount of evil we experience counts against the existence of God. 
His conclusion, though, is that since this skeptical line of defense renders 
God virtually indefensible and may well undercut the concept of moral-
ity theists want to affirm, this line of reasoning does not defeat the claim 
that, “judging from the facts of the world, the existence of God is or seems 
improbable” (p. 168).
Nor, O’Connor maintains, do the attempts by theists such as Richard 
Swinburne and John Hick to explain the occurrence of evils in our world 
fare any better, as their appeal to human freedom doesn’t explain why a 
good God would grant freedom without restraint or exception, given the 
horrendous evils human freedom can and does produce, and their ap-
peals to an afterlife don’t justify evils experienced in this life.
So where does O’Connor believe all this leaves us? what we found 
while behind the veil, he maintains, is that although our experience of 
seemingly pointless evil doesn’t render God’s existence impossible, “the 
facts of evil in the world [are] strong enough evidence to make it improb-
able that there is a God.” And we found that an open investigation does 
not support the belief in a perfect supernatural creator as “the best expla-
nation of the origin and nature of our universe” (p. 213).
but what if we come out from behind the veil and assess the situation 
as believers? what we have discovered behind the veil, O’Connor tells us, 
is enough to discredit attempts by “evidentialist” theists to demonstrate 
on the basis of objective data that God exists as the creator of all. However, 
this does not necessarily mean, he concludes, that a person cannot justifi-
ably believe in the existence and creative activity of God. For it may be 
the case that the believer is sincere in reporting experience of the divine 
and “so long as the believer does not suppose this counts as evidence, it 
can ground the believer’s religious outlook, and perhaps enable it to with-
stand even strong evidence pointing the other way” (p. 221).
Overall, I find O’Connor’s work impressive. He is a very clear, acces-
sible writer. His approach is comprehensive in that it covers all the impor-
tant issues. And his discussion of the key figures and perspectives is un-
failingly complete and fair. I do, though, have three significant concerns.
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First, the freewill defense O’Connor outlines is based on the assumption 
that God has granted humans “full-time libertarian freedom,” by which 
he seems to mean that God has decided to grant all persons libertarian 
freedom all the time “without constraint or exception.” My understanding 
is quite different. As I see it, while all freewill theists do believe that God 
cannot both grant a person freedom and control the outcome of its use, 
most freewill theists believe God has retained the right to withhold free-
dom from any given person in relation to any given decision at any time. 
This does, of course, rightly leave the freewill theist open to the important 
question of why a good God has not chosen more frequently to exercise 
this veto power. but it also allows for the possibility of interventive divine 
activity in our world—for example, through intervention in our lives in 
response to prayer—in a way that gives God more control over how the 
world runs, including more control over the ultimate outcome of things in 
relation to evil, than O’Connor believes to be the case.
Second, O’Connor’s invitation to step behind the veil of ignorance—
to pretend that we aren’t theists or nontheists or pretend we don’t know 
anything about religion or philosophy—seems to me both unrealistic and 
unhelpful. I agree completely that we should consider all points of view, 
including those differing from ours, as openly and honestly as possible. 
but the idea that we can actually suspend belief for the sake of analy-
sis seems to me quite inconsistent with contemporary theories of belief 
formation, which hold that how we understand and interpret new infor-
mation is always pre-volitionally shaped significantly by our basic beliefs 
about the world, including any basic religious or moral beliefs that have 
been formed by our interaction with the socio-cultural settings with which 
we have had contact. If this is correct, then the assumption that stepping 
behind the veil will give us neutral, unbiased information is a dangerous 
myth in that it can unjustifiably give more rational credence to the results 
of our deliberations than is deserved.
This brings us to my greatest concern: O’Connor’s basic epistemic as-
sumption that we can in some meaningful sense determine objectively 
whether certain perspectives about God and the relationship between God 
and evil are reasonable. I have argued and continue to believe, rather, that 
in relation to any significant metaphysical or moral issue on which there 
are competing explanatory hypotheses, there exist no objective, non-ques-
tion-begging criteria apart from self-consistency for determining whether 
any given perspective is in fact the most reasonable. And if this is so, then 
O’Connor’s implicit contention that believers must add faith to reason to 
remain believers in the face of evil while nonbelievers can rely solely on 
reason is misguided. It is rather the case that theists and nontheists alike 
must choose by “faith” among competing self-consistent options with re-
spect to God and evil, with none of the self-consistent choices bringing 
with it, in principle, greater objective, neutral support.
Nevertheless, I still recommend this book highly for anyone with an 
interest in the topic.
